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PRESENTATION BY THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
TO THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEES
3 OCTOBER 1958


Gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be here today. I'm sorry I can't say gentlemen and ladies, because I was hopeful that we would have some young ladies as JOT's: they are valuable and respected officers in the intelligence profession today.

You've heard some ^{heady} things about Junior Officer Trainees and you've also gotten a wet towel from Mr. Baird on a couple of occasions about what's expected of you and the trials and tribulations that are forthcoming. I personally feel that it's a real honor. It's certainly a pleasure for me to be here on the opening of this program, and I'd like to add just a small glass of heady wine to what's been said, because I think that this is a very memorable occasion for the United States intelligence services to start a program of this nature. Perhaps the reason why I feel this way is best illustrated by a personal anecdote. The winter of 1943 I was an Army officer assigned to the Office of Strategic Services in London. I was on the what was then called the SI - secret intelligence - side of the business, and I was called in by my boss one day, along with two other officers, and we were advised that the following week we were being sent up to Glasgow to audit for a week the Polish Intelligence School. So the three of us went up there. Between the three of us our foreign languages consisted of: I had German and French, one of the other officers had just French, and one of the others had just German. None of the Poles spoke French. They refused to speak German because it was the enemy language; so this week we got along mainly on a mixture of English and Polish and we found out that the fact that they put a bottle of Vat 69 on the lunch table every noon for eight of us to consume before lunch assisted the communications considerably. But the point of this whole story, gentlemen, is this. We found that the Poles had there in Glasgow a small school. They only had about two dozen officers attending it, but a very thorough school. Their country was occupied by a traditional enemy; yet in wartime with their country occupied they were putting their officers through a one year course, before they actually sent them into the field. So I feel it very significant when the Central Intelligence Agency has reached a degree of maturity where you are going to get fairly close to a year before we actually put you in the line. I might add that from the Inspector General's point of view this is also a happy note, because once you get in the line we have found by experience that your supervisors are going to so value your effort that it's going to be hard to pry you loose for additional training. And this is one of the reasons why you are Mr. Baird's possessions for the next two years so that he and can guide your destinies.

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In some ways I feel that my talk after Mr. Baird's and the Director's is somewhat of an anticlimax: what I'm going to talk about today is mostly theoretical. I think for the purposes of classification we could say that the attributes of an intelligence officer which I am going to describe are probably unclassified. There's no reason why these shouldn't be known. I've mentioned them in public gatherings, particularly when I was going around to different colleges and universities to talk to people. But some of the illustrations which I intend to use are fairly highly classified, so I will leave it to your judgment as to what you want to say about it when tonight in gatherings around your cock-tails you discuss what you've heard today and look forward to the course you are going to have.

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What is an intelligence officer? I could make this one of the shortest addresses of all time and say Allen Dulles is an intelligence officer and you just heard him. He undoubtedly is one of the great officers of our time. He has achieved in clandestine intelligence operations some of the most memorable achievements to which an intelligence officer could aspire. His penetration of the German Foreign Office, the German intelligence services and the German high command during World War II are magnificent. The information that came out of there was practically unparalleled, and his negotiation of the surrender of the German forces in Italy is a widely heralded achievement.

But what I am going to talk about is not so much the achievements of an individual but the attributes of a man that enables him to make those achievements. Now an intelligence officer could be the traditional fellow with a raincoat, slouch hat and a pipe in his mouth traveling on the Orient Express and always, at least according to Hollywood, carrying Top Secrets. Or an intelligence officer could be the glamorous woman of the high international society who uses her natural assets to get from a cabinet minister that which money couldn't buy and nobody could steal. Or an intelligence officer could be sitting right here at a desk in Washington, a person who is more interested in facts than in people and who will get all the information on Vietnam and be able at a moment's notice to give you a run down on the exact situation in Vietnam, their relations with Cambodia, Laos, Communist China and the various personalities therein. Or an intelligence officer could be a man who specializes in making concealment devices so that the agent crossing a denied frontier can put in the heel of his shoe 420 pages of microfilm of highly classified information or to developing a better microphone to put in the walls so it can't be detected by a sweep looking for audio surveillance devices. Or if you want to carry it even further, an intelligence officer could be an administrator or a finance officer or a jump master or an ordnance officer - you name it - they are all in the intelligence profession and in the course of your careers in this Agency you'll meet many of them.

Let's look for a moment at what the intelligence profession is. What is intelligence in the United States Government? Well, basically intelligence is the handling of information. A newspaper, in a sense, is an intelligence organization. It collects and it gathers news and it sells it to the public, but the similarity between a newspaper and an intelligence organization fades away there. For a newspaper doesn't necessarily have to be accurate or thorough or any of the other aspects that are vital to an intelligence organization. It can appeal to the popular fancy which may, like sex, or crime, or sports, still sell a lot of newspapers and it may not be completely accurate in its reporting. An intelligence organization in Washington today could be likened to a mighty river; the flow of information into Washington from abroad is of almost incalculable proportions. It's like the Mississippi in full flood and the flow of information reports, if not controlled, could inundate the Government procedure and wreak havoc and chaos. We could be likened in some instances to the hydro-electric or navigation dams along the river which channelize the flow of the water into energy. One of the roles of the intelligence organization is to sift out this great flow of paper coming into Washington, to take that which is significant, channelize it in the proper direction so that the hundreds of

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thousands of pages of information that come into Washington weekly are boiled down to the less than one hundred that the top policy makers get through our procedures each week. This information is the vital information by which they will either change a policy decision - and you've gotten certain reflections of that in the developments in the recent weeks - or make new policy decisions. I believe the Director pointed out very graphically the vital aspects of intelligence work in this connection today. There is another similarity between the flow of a mighty river and the intelligence procedure: just as you get into the hydro-electric phase the water is channelized and it goes harder and faster in order to create energy, so in the intelligence community the information now is down and it gets on a higher and higher echelon where the top echelon of your intelligence community analyzes it before the hard-hitting core goes to the President and the policy makers of the Government. So this is the intelligence organization which we are talking about.

Now gentlemen, in the major phases of our work which you will start hearing about next week, you will find that an intelligence organization such as the CIA and our Soviet counterparts will be dealing not only with the collection and analysis of information. It will also be engaged in other forms of activity which are, shall we say, typical of the Cold War, such as political warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, and even in certain instances paramilitary or guerrilla activities. But the heart matter, gentlemen, of the intelligence organization - and I hope none of you will ever forget this - is information. You cannot mount a political warfare operation, you can't engage in paramilitary activities, your psychological warfare will boomerang on you, unless you have the facts, unless you have the intelligence on which to base your activities. This is something which in our enthusiasm over a particular operation we are inclined to forget. But remember the name of the Agency. It's the Central Intelligence Agency and it is the gathering and processing of information which is the heart of any intelligence organization. So consequently, I am going to use the denominator today of the intelligence officers who start - as I hope most of you will do - in learning about the intelligence handling, the handling of information, that is the printed type. Now the attributes which Colonel Baird referred to in a certain part of his discussion are many of the same ones I want to discuss briefly with you today.

Some of you probably already have most of these attributes. In fact, it's almost inevitable that you will have a large combination of these. If we are a wise organization, as you complete your formal training and go into on-the-job training, our management system will see that you are placed in jobs where your combination of these attributes will be most effective, just as personnel management in its soundest terms would do in any area of human endeavor. It's the same thing on a football team. You put your tall, fast man at the ends and your middle-sized strong men at the tackles, and your short, fast men at the guards and so on, and you end up with a winning team. This is simply putting a combination of those individuals with the best assets in the right places. I was struck by one item which Mr. Baird mentioned which is certainly pertinent to bring in here. He alerted you to something which is true of all large organizations, Government or business - and I've been in both - and that is you inevitably will run across other individuals either on a parallel to you or

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possibly occasionally your supervisor where either bureaucracy or lack of wisdom may prevail. We know from experience that this has caused certain frustrations. But I think one of the reasons why this Agency is constantly in receipt of flattering comments by Congressmen, by senior officials with other agencies, by American businessmen and others concerning the high caliber of our personnel and the hard-hitting guard of the organization is the fact that we are constantly alert to this. One of my jobs is to be watching for it at all times and to clear it out of the way.

Now with that as a background and a general discussion of the intelligence organizations, what are the attributes that make a good intelligence officer? I put down on a card ten of them which I want to mention today, but I do want to stress that these are not in any order of importance and for certain types of intelligence work certain of these attributes are more important and for other work less important. I have started off and ended up with two that I consider very important.

The first one which I think is vital is a knowledge of people and a desire to understand people. Let me mention first that I think this is almost an essential ingredient in clandestine intelligence operations, because, as you'll learn through the weeks in these courses, particularly those of you who are going into clandestine services and decide that that's where you are going to concentrate your career, basically a clandestine intelligence operation is making somebody else do what you want him to do and controlling him to such a complete degree that he, in effect, is almost your puppet. To do this you have to know the individual. If you approach him the wrong way he's not going to do it. If you don't know how to control him and what you want to accomplish you're not going to have a great agent on your hands. You're going to find friction there. Among the things that you will hear mentioned as we go along is the dangers of the case officer falling in love with his agent, and I am using that totally in the sense that it's simply a matter of expression. The relationship between a case officer and his agent is a very close one. They see a great deal of each other. The case officer instructs the agent as to what he wants him to do. The agent in turn brings the information and the case officer has to spend long hard hours with this man to get out the facts that we want. The most successful case officers are those who know their agents best and that have that man's life right at their fingertips. They know everything that motivates him, all of the driving forces that go behind his desire to be an agent. The one thing that you must recognize here is that you must establish an identity of interests between yourself and that agent, whether he be a [redacted] or any other individual, [redacted] or whatever it may be. You must have established an identity of interests and as you know you cannot establish identity of interests with anybody unless you know him pretty well.

Now, gentlemen, one of the great breakthroughs which is not talked about and which, incidentally, has not yet been achieved is going to be achieved sometime in the early years of your career with this Agency. To my mind it's going to be a breakthrough of as great magnitude as Sputnik and all of the other great scientific achievements. This breakthrough is going to be when we find identity of interests with the Russians, so that we'll be able to organize in the Soviet Union the clandestine intelligence network which is absolute to the security of

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this country. We have not yet found that formula, not yet found what appeals to a Russian - such as a man that has had the training that Mr. Baird described - that will make him go to work for us over a long-term basis as an agent. I, for one, think that this can be done. We don't have the scientific and technical ways to find out everything that's going on inside Russia. If you can invent the greatest devices in the world you are still not going to find out the intentions of the Soviet Union until you get an officer inside the Kremlin or inside the General Staff or inside the Foreign Ministry. Then we are going to start getting intentions and then I certainly, for one, am going to sleep longer hours and much more easily. This is basic - knowledge of people.

What makes the Russians tick? How can we establish an identity of interest with ourselves? I think this is one of the reasons why Mr. Baird emphasized academic ability so much and insisted upon language and area training. Basically, gentlemen, you can't really know the other guy if you are going to have to talk to him in half of his own language and half of yours. You must know that language and know what he's read and why he thinks the way he does. So item one on the attributes of what is an intelligence officer - knowledge of people and a liking of people. If you don't like people then I'd recommend that you go into research, because unless you like to be with people, unless you like to sit and talk to somebody and find out what really makes him tick, you are not going to be at top flight in your handling of agents, which is one of the basic things that you will start doing in the clandestine services.

Item two is judgment. Judgment is a highly important factor for every one of you to have. It grows increasingly important as you grow more and more senior. One of the things that we must rely upon in this Agency is judgment. You will find among the frustrations of bureaucracy that you encounter that we have a great number of regulations in the Agency, volumes of regulations. In fact, at the last count I think we had something over 940 regulatory issuances. But we don't pay you and we haven't hired you because of your ability to read a regulation. Those regulations are there for guidance, somewhere to go to get a clue as to how it can be done. We are paying you for your judgment. Now in this regard we expect you to make mistakes. In fact, I am sure that in the training courses they will wonder why you don't make mistakes: you are entering a new profession and we don't assume, unless our Security Office has fallen down somewhere, that any of you have been intelligence officers before. Thus you are going to learn from the start what an intelligence officer is; there will be mistakes, and mistakes will be called to your attention. But we are very openminded about mistakes. There's not one of us in senior positions that hasn't made mistakes; you can't avoid making mistakes in the intelligence business. The Director has often compared the intelligence business to oil prospecting. You are going to hit some gushers and you are going to hit a lot that are not gushers. Consequently, you are going to spend money or you are going to explore areas where it is not going to be profitable. By the same token, you are going to recruit agents and you are going to wake up some morning and find out you've got a Soviet intelligence agent right on your hands. There was a mistake; somewhere along the line you didn't do something that you should have done. But this is something which we hope you'll get out of your systems during your training program and your early indoctrination, particularly in the field. Let me just

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mention a few of the types of judgment that are essential. Operating in the field you have got to know when to meet an agent and where to meet an agent, and you will certainly do it real often. If you do it wrong you may be persona non grata and your agent may be dead or spending a long vacation in some remote spot. You have also got to know when to try and recruit somebody. The Director mentioned a very outstanding piece of work by one of our younger officers and this involved a major area of judgment. In teaching this fellow English I am sure the thought crossed his mind practically on a daily basis: "Do I want to make the pitch to him? Do I want to try and recruit him, or is it too dangerous? Is he too high in his government for me to try and recruit as one of our agents? Should I just let him stay as a contact?" This is judgment: the one man and the only man who can make this decision is the man on the firing line. He can make it far better than some case officer sitting back here in Washington who has to guess it by cable, or even from his senior officer right there working out of the same station. So it's a matter of judgment.

Now the third attribute that I want to mention is one that may seem like a silly one to some of you but I think you'd better hear it now, and that is energy. This is a very energetic business. It's a twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year business. Matt Baird mentioned this when talking to your wives; your wives are going to be the first to notice this. They are going to notice that your energies are going more and more into your profession, that hobbies which you had before are getting less and less of your time. Families notice it. We have to acknowledge it as part of the work; all aspects of the work require a great deal of your time. This is something that I think is essential for you to know in the early days of the work. I think I can safely say that the bulk of the people are here because they like intelligence work. Consequently, the hours they work do not seem to make too much difference to them. Now you'd better use judgment in utilizing your energy, because you can expend it at too rapid a rate and find yourself exhausted or sick, and good health is important to us also. An intelligence officer has to be an energetic person; regardless of what John P. Marquand and others may write, you don't get fat and lazy in this work. We are up against some pretty fast competition, not only in the Soviet intelligence service but there are also several other major intelligence services at work in the world and consequently a tremendous amount of effort is required. And mind you, gentlemen, we are matching you against about ten of your equivalents of the Soviet side. I think, probably quite conservatively, that they have about ten officers for every one of ours and we still think we can lick them at the same race. Now in analyzing this you have to recognize that this is a democracy and we want to keep it that way. We can't expend any greater proportion of the taxpayers' money to increase the size of our intelligence service. So consequently we are a small service fighting a very large service. When you take all of the Communist services together then the odds are even greater. We aren't pulling you into a battle or Marathon or Horatio at the bridge. We think we can do it.

A fourth attribute of the good intelligence officer that I want to mention is an inquisitive nature - curiosity. You want to know what's going on around you. You probably know the FBI, our sister service, whose direction is in quite a different area from ours. One of their training courses takes the men to a room; the officer is sent into the room and he is allowed 45 seconds; he comes out and is

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told to sit down and write everything that is in that room. Now this is fast observation. Ours goes much further than that. We've got to answer the basic questions: what, where, when, why, and how. When you are out in the field collecting information and one of your agents brings in a report it is supposed to answer all of those questions. If it doesn't, there will be an irate cable from Washington asking the questions that were unanswered in the report. You will have to go back to your agent, and so on. But an inquisitive nature is absolutely essential to good intelligence work. During World War II one of our military attaches, when we still had diplomatic relations with Berlin, went into the OKW one day to see an officer: he simply happened to look around the room and notice that where previously the walls had been covered with maps of France and Western Europe, on this particular occasion the walls were covered with maps of Poland and Eastern Europe and Russia. That colonel went out and sent a flash back to the War Department and said, "I think the Germans are planning an attack on Russia." It was the first warning that this country got that the Germans were going to attack the Russians. That was quite contrary, you will remember, to some of the political developments there were at the time. But he was an inquisitive officer. He looked around him when he was there. He wanted to see what was going on. As an aspect of the inquisitive side of intelligence work is the fact that good newspaper men get along by asking all of the questions, even the most embarrassing ones. If you are a New York Times reader and read the transcripts of some of Foster Dulles' press conferences and the press conferences of the President, you will find every embarrassing question in the book is usually there. Intelligence officers should be somewhat the same way. The worst you can get is no.

The next is one which is closely related to this. It is imagination. I think a good intelligence officer, one who is out to get information, has to be imaginative. It is emphasized by the Buck Rogers age which we are entering, the age of space relations, the age in which imagination is hard-pressed to keep up with some of the scientific developments. It is underlined by some of the computer

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
Our next one, and you may say, "Well, that's very close to some of the others he has mentioned," but I think it is important to name it, is Balance. Balance is an attribute of the good intelligence officer. What do we mean by balance? Well, I think it is important that I mention this because so often the fiction about intelligence, and the over glamorization of some of the OSS exploits - and I mention this not to the derogation of anything my colleagues in OSS did, but simply the fact that the way it's written up it looks a little better than it actually was - sometimes gives the impression that the intelligence officer is an eccentric and that he is an odd type that gets in and does things that the regular fellow could not do. This is not true. Look around you, gentlemen, and you will find a group of very well-balanced individuals. Because we want balance in our intelligence officer. It's not exactly judgment, though it certainly pertains to judgment, but it's a balanced officer. It's one who is going to recognize his weaknesses as well as his assets and who will report accordingly.

Another very important aspect of the intelligence officer is open-mindedness. You can't develop prejudices; you can't develop prejudices about people, or places, or things in this particular work. I always am a little

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
skeptical when I talk to some of our people who have returned from overseas.



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one of those positions who will have some of the most interesting things to say in these letters. I was thinking particularly, in discussing this, of a man who is in a very key area of the world. This key area is not too far developed. He has tremendous prejudices, all right, and his letters reflect them. His division is now considering as to whether he shouldn't be reassigned because he can't report to us objectively about what's going on in that area. His mind isn't open to what's coming in. He's decided that this particular race are a bunch of so and so's and these guys have never yet made a wise decision and the natives of the country will never grow up to be anything. Now this is not right and this is not having open-mindedness.

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This problem is similar in many countries of the world today. The changes of government can be fast and furious. Where you concentrate on the conservatives, for example, and ignore the labor party, when the labor party comes in why you might as well fold up your tent and go home. This is something that definitely is essential for an intelligence service - to be open-minded and catholic about its approach. We must deal with everybody. We must not fix prejudices.

Now I would like to use an illustration here that indicates a possible failing on my part during World War II. I was assigned to the Strategic Intelligence Board for a short period and with a group of officers prepared a report

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which was asked for by the European Theater which was to analyze German manpower losses and to predict or to make a forecast of how many troops the Germans would have for use after the Allied invasion in Western Europe. We did a very careful study based upon the best available facts concerning how many men the Germans would have to lose before they would stop fighting. To make a long story short, the Germans had lost that many men by January 1945. Before the war had ended they had lost several million more. As intelligence officers we had failed because we failed to take into account the personality of Adolf Hitler. We were probably too prejudiced by the traditional military concepts as to what manpower losses can be suffered before hostilities must cease.

The next attribute is flexibility. This means the ability and willingness to change jobs, to change countries, and even to change your way of life when this is needed by the organization. This is what we mean by career service: serving where, when and how the agency wants, the agency obviously not making a capricious request and certainly giving personal factors due consideration. But this is a service of directed assignment. We have to put you where the Agency needs you, and as you probably know we have an agreement with the Pentagon so that those of you who are reserve officers or who will become reserve officers are going to stay right with us if open hostilities break out. This is absolutely vital, because that is going to be the time when every service is going to want intelligence officers, Army, Navy, Marines, and the Air Force, all will be trying to get these officers back if they can. It's absolutely essential that we have a cadre of career officers who will serve where we want them to and when we want them to. A good illustration of this is the war in Korea. Mr. Baird mentioned the tremendous influx of personnel we had during that era of the Korean War. But I simply want to illustrate this point by saying that when the war started on June 25, 1950, we had in Korea and by the end of 1950 we had nearly which we had to throw into that particular front line to get the intelligence that was required in order to conduct the campaigns.

Now the next attribute that I want to mention this afternoon is thoroughness, and this is absolutely essential in any part of this organization, because one gap in the chain can have a tremendous and a dangerous effect on the end intelligence product. We must be very thorough in all of the type of work that we do. This is true of intelligence collection, it's true of intelligence analysis, it's true of estimating. It's obviously true in the clandestine side of the handling of agents. The best illustration here is what happens to an agent if you haven't been thorough in your sending him across one of the black borders or so-called denied areas of Communist held territory. Well, you've got a dead agent on your hands. The odds are going to be pretty good you'll never hear from him again. So thoroughness is a very, very essential factor here. I don't think that I have to emphasize the necessity of thoroughness on the intelligence production side of the house; here obviously it's going to be important that if you are doing an analysis of the Communist Chinese intentions toward the Offshore islands and you by chance leave out a couple of artillery battalions, this might well affect the entire estimate or the entire

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decision made by the United States Government as to what we do about the Offshore islands. So thoroughness is absolutely essential.

And then the last attribute of the intelligence officer - and you will recall when I started I said I was starting off with a very important one and ending up with a very important one. Mr. Baird referred to this indirectly. This is the attribute of self-expression; the ability to express yourself well both in writing and orally. I think is one of the very, very important attributes which we all must have. This is true in agent handling. If you can't express yourself to your agent you obviously are not going to get across to him what you want. In fact, you probably wouldn't even recruit him in the first place. So there it's vital. In the second place, it comes in probably too great a degree in reports. Now if you ever hear my lecture on bureaucracy among the things I will mention is the fact that we're laden down with paper work in the intelligence organization and particularly CIA. Part of this paper work is very essential because you will find that out long before the first intelligence report is written by you and sent in from your first agent, if you are operating in the field: you will have written a complete personal history statement of this man so it can be checked to make sure he isn't working for some other intelligence service or is a known Communist, and you will write up a detailed project outline. In other words, you will have to express yourself to a tremendous degree and you will have to do it accurately and precisely and, we hope, concisely so that the paper work will be held down. Obviously if your information is good and it isn't presented clearly and correctly it can be useless simply because of the fact that you haven't been able to express yourself. I'm not sure I would agree with Mr. Baird that after three degrees in English he couldn't write, but we do find one of the important things about even the graduates of our best colleges with advanced degrees who come here is that they can't write or they can't speak. I hope all of you have had public speaking and have had experience in writing, because we think this is one of the basic fundamentals in the work of an intelligence organization.

Here, gentlemen, are the attributes or what makes a good intelligence officer. In thinking about these attributes, do what any wise man does. Put your best foot forward. Put your best combinations of abilities together and choose the course that you are going to follow throughout your career in this organization by the best combinations of your personal traits and characteristics, and obviously by the work that you like best because it's a basic factor in human life that the person who likes his job does a far better job than the person who doesn't really like it. Go into that aspect of a career which you find not only challenging and interesting but which combines your best capabilities and consequently you'll go ahead faster.

Next week I am going to have the privilege of talking to you about the future of the American intelligence service. I think you will find it interesting because here I can tell you where we stand today vis-a-vis the other intelligence services and where I think we are going to stand in ten or twenty years from now. I think it is important for all of you to recognize that we are fighting what is called the Cold War and this particular Cold War switches back and forth to the hot side and gets close to what the Press call the brink every so often. There is nothing phony

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about this war. This is indeed an intense and determined struggle between two major world combinations for the domination of the world. There are four major arms of the United States Government fighting this Cold War. Major arm one is the diplomats, the foreign service, the Secretary of State who is waging the Cold War through the various facets of diplomacy. This would include military type diplomacy and the movement of military forces in peacetime. Aspect two of the Cold War is the economic warfare that is being waged overtly - Point Four, ICA, economic aid, military aid. By this way we are trying to hold back the Communist menace. If you have read the papers carefully in recent years, and particularly noted one of the speeches our Director made about the economic warfare of the Soviets - it's in the papers today about their exploiting the tin market - you will know that this is a very key aspect of the Cold War that is being waged. As you all know, the United States Government is spending billions for the economic struggle and the economic arm of the Cold War effort. The third side is the overt war for men's minds: psychological warfare or propaganda, if you will, personified in our United States Information Agency and the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and other aspects of trying to get the Free World point of view across, which is waging in the neutral countries principally today. This is the third arm of the Cold War. This is a major part of the struggle and a vital part of the struggle. We are not only operating against the Soviet intelligence service per se and all of the satellite intelligence services - and that even greater enigma than the Soviet service, the Chinese Communist service - but we are operating against the Communist Party throughout the world, the elements that the Soviets use so effectively to push their arms in all of the front organizations that they mount. This is a war which is never advertised, and when it is it's usually adversely advertised toward us; we are accused in the press of having lost a particular battle, lost an Iraq, or lost this or that. But the intelligence arm of this Cold War is constantly going on. It is going on at a vigorous and occasionally violent rate. I should mention here, gentlemen, don't be discouraged and don't worry when you read in the press that the U.S. intelligence or CIA is specifically and often called as being caught short or this or that or the other thing is going on; in recent years our great press has been - and I am speaking as a former newspaperman - our great press has been wrong at least 75 percent of the time. But we can never defend ourselves. We never will defend ourselves in public, this would destroy too many assets and it would catch us between the policy makers and the Congress. So this is something you are just going to have to learn and learn at an early stage as one of the things that you put up with in the intelligence service. You can't discuss it or argue it publicly because that would be insecure. The Director does not discuss it or argue it publicly. We've been attacked by some of the best. But this is one of the penalties that you are going to have to pay in this particular profession. Some people are going to say to you, "What did the CIA organization do in Iraq?" and all you can do is smile sweetly and say, "Well, that's something I don't think we can discuss now" and let it ride there. To be truly effective in the Cold War, the less that is said about what the intelligence arm is doing publicly the better off we are and the more effectively we can operate. Gentlemen, in about a year or two from now when you are overseas you are going to really understand what I mean here, because you are going to find out that everything that is

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published in the American press, every time CIA is mentioned, it is going to have repercussions, which is not going to be too good where you are.

So you have now entered into this fourth arm of the Cold War, the intelligence struggle. It is a fascinating struggle, it is a demanding struggle. At the moment I would say that intelligence-wise we are probably battling, but this isn't good enough. This is one that we have got to win, because when these four arms of the Cold War fail, then military services come into action, and our objective is not war but peace. If we are a good intelligence service, I think we are going to achieve peace.

Thank you very much. It has been a pleasure to speak to you.

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